Lethal Design at Sullivan Mine?
Four deaths might have been prevented says frustrated physics instructor.
Shawn Currier and Kim Weitzel
A Vancouver physics instructor believes he may have identified design flaws that led to the deaths of four people at the Sullivan Mine in Kimberley last spring, but his efforts to alert the chief inspector of mines and present his theories to an upcoming coroner's inquest have so far been met with silence, he says.
The government called for the inquest after an Oct. 30 accident report from the province's then-chief inspector of mines Fred Hermann drew criticism from surviving family members and other members of the public, including politicians and union officials.
'No One Would Have Died'
Moen's emailed analyses to Chief Inspector of Mines.
On Oct. 31, the day after the public release of the chief inspector of mines report on the Sullivan Mine deaths, Capilano College physics instructor Vernon Moen sent an e-mail to the inspector's office arguing that the design of the weir and sump beneath the fatal shed was faulty and may have been responsible for filling the sampling shed with lethal oxygen-depleted air:
"A sump is supposed to be designed to prevent the influx of gases. Think of a toilet bowl, or a sink trap. In this case the diagram indicates no outflow, and one inflow. By all accounts the inflow was not trapped by the water in the sump.
"There are only three possibilities, none of which were addressed by your ministry reports:
"1. If there was an outflow, then the inflow was not significantly below the outflow. This is a serious design flaw.
"2. The inflow was not at the bottom of the sump, thus not trapped by the water in the sump. This is a serious design flaw.
"3. The sump was dry. This is a serious design flaw, and is unlikely because the technician was down the sump sampling the water when he died. If a sump can be expected to become dry, then normal design requirements would impose special restrictions on the design of the inflow precisely to prevent gas migration. Toxic gas accumulation was an obvious hazard, given the location and purpose of the sump.
"The fact that the 'toxic gas' in this case was an oxygen-depleted atmosphere is irrelevant. It can be assumed that gases accumulated in close proximity to possible hazardous materials will not be fit for breathing. The gases should never have had direct access to the sump. If these gases had been trapped by water, no one would have died. These considerations have been around for centuries, and are not new to the design of sumps collecting waste water from a dump site. This sump was not engineered: it was built, and with tragic consequences."
Moen's argument is that the standard design for a sump includes putting the inflow or source of new fluid below the liquids in the sump to prevent any inflow of gas as liquids enter the sump, and placement of the outflow pipe above the point where new liquids enter to further guard against gas entering through the inflow pipe. And that neither of these standard precautions were in place in the design of the sump at the Sullivan Mine. Therefore, lack of compliance with these standard design requirements allowed the shed to fill with de-oxygenated air that entered through the improperly placed inflow pipe.
In a follow up e-mail Nov. 3, Moen told the inspector:
"After having seen the photos and diagram provided by Teck Cominco, it is obvious that if the bottom of the 'V' in the V-notch weir had been placed 12 inches higher no one would have died."
According to Moen, a dam-like structure built across the sump between the inflow pipe and the outflow pipe should have been placed at least a foot higher than it was in order to further guard against underground gases entering the sump. (Photos of the sump and weir are available on pages 80 and 81 of the Teck report, available here.)
-- Tom Sandborn
Critics said the report should have looked more closely at possible flaws in the design of the below-ground sump under the structure in which the workers died, and at whether management's failure to enforce safety regulations was part of the lethal equation. A copy of the Hermann report can be found here.
A coroner's inquest is precluded from making any findings of fault or blame, but family members of victims told The Tyee they hope the inquest will provide answers to questions still hanging.
The Hermann report described the fatal events stretching out over two days in May as "unprecedented," saying no such loss of life due to oxygen depleted air had occurred anywhere else in the world. It goes on to say that the lethal air's entry into the shed was unexpected.
The implication, say critics, is that the events were so unique that no reasonable steps could have been taken to reduce the risks at the Sullivan Mine.
"I have to hand it to the government," said NDP labour critic Chuck Puchmayr in a recent phone interview. "They have done a brilliant job of spinning this issue. This was not a freak accident, and not unavoidable."
'E-mails went unanswered'
Vernon Moen is a physics instructor at the Lower Mainland's Capilano College, and is involved in a company that designs and markets navigation systems for aircraft. He also has extensive practical experience in house construction and auto mechanics. Moen told The Tyee that he suspects design flaws in the below-ground sump covered by the water sampling shed may have led to a build up of de-oxygenated air in the confined space that killed the workers and rescue team. (A diagram of the shed, from the Hermann report, is here.)
Moen says he tried to raise his concerns in e-mails (see sidebar) to the chief inspector of mines, but has received no reply, and is now worried that design flaw concerns may not be properly addressed by the upcoming coroner's inquest.
Despite the debate, some of facts are clear. On May 15, 2006, Doug Erickson, working for Pryzm Environmental, a company with a contract from Teck Cominco to monitor environmental impacts associated with water flowing underground over waste rock on the former mine site, went into a shed (the #1 Shaft Waste Rock Dump monitoring building) to take water samples from the below-ground-level sump accessible from that structure.
The shed was full of severely oxygen-depleted air and Erickson succumbed almost immediately. (At oxygen levels tested within the sump after the deaths, an exposed individual would be unconscious within the time it takes to breath in twice, the chief mine inspector's report says.)
The Mines Act requires an isolated worker to be checked for safety each two and a half hours, and that workers entering and leaving a mine site must be formally logged on and off the site. However, no one in authority at the Sullivan Mine site seems to have realized Erickson had gone missing for two days. The first reported search for Erickson began on the morning of May 17, after his wife contacted Teck Cominco offices and said he was missing.
Searching for Erickson on the morning of May 17, Bob Newcombe, a Teck Cominco employee, found the contractor's truck outside the water sampling shed. Newcombe entered the shed and fell unconscious in the lethal atmosphere. Two more victims were claimed in the following hours, as B.C. Ambulance attendants Kim Weitzel and Shawn Currier, responding to a 911 call, entered the shed to try to rescue the fallen workers and were overcome.
Chief inspector: 'No evident design flaws'
Moen has tried for months (see sidebar) to interest authorities in his theory that the design of the weir and sump beneath the fatal shed was faulty and may have been responsible for filling the sampling shed with lethal oxygen-depleted air. (A sump is a pit or hole in which superfluous liquid collects in a basement, mine or machine. A weir is a dam-like structure built to regulate the flow of liquid. Beneath the water sampling shed at the Sullivan Mine, a ladder led down into the sump where a notched weir had been built between the inflow pipe and the outflow pipe for purposes of flow measurement.)
Fred Hermann was chief inspector of mines at the time of the deaths, and retired from public service soon after completing the report on the Sullivan Mine events to take a position in the private sector. Reached at his new offices at Breakwater Resources, an Ontario mining firm, Hermann declined to comment on his report or on Moen's critique of sump design for this story. He suggested The Tyee contact Ricci Berdusco, who had worked closely with him on the Sullivan report and who is B.C.'s new chief inspector of mines.
Berdusco responded to The Tyee in an e-mail, saying: "There are no evident design flaws in the sump and the weir. These structures were meant to collect water and afford a means of sampling the flow and chemical characteristics of the water."
Berdusco also confirmed that check-in/check-out procedures required by law were not being observed at the Sullivan Mine last May. He denied, however, that this company's failure to observe the law caused any of the Sullivan Mine deaths.
'Have to examine sump design'
Repeated calls to Teck Cominco spokespeople with requests for comment on the sump design question or on failures to enforce Mine Act safety requirements were not returned as this story went to press.
Professor John Meech teaches mine engineering at the University of British Columbia. A researcher into mine safety issues with more than a quarter century's experience, Dr. Meech is currently serving as an independent academic advisor on a committee formed by Teck Cominco that is looking into the Sullivan Mine tragedy. He expressed some skepticism about Moen's critique of the sump and weir design, but did indicate that changes made to the waste rock dump surface (changes which covered the drainage ditch conveying water to the sampling shed with glacial till rich in clay, thus sealing it off from the air above) shortly before the lethal incidents may have been factors in allowing de-oxygenated air to accumulate.
"The risk potential was zero before the ditch was covered," Meech told The Tyee by phone. "After the fall of 2005 when the ditch was covered, there was a higher risk. We do have to examine sump design to prevent a recurrence."
This assessment by Dr. Meech confirms suspicions previously expressed by George Weitzel, who lost his wife Kim in the Sullivan Mine disaster. In an interview with The Tyee in late 2006, Weitzel said his suspicion was that the 2005 decision by Teck Cominco to cover the waste rock dump and its drainage ditch with clay-rich glacial till had created an air-tight seal that allowed the formation of lethally oxygen-depleted air which was then conveyed into the sampling shed.
"Teck Cominco, in our opinion, designed and built the shed and the seal. They didn't do their due diligence on either the shed or the seal," Weitzel said.
Dr. Meech amplified his views in an email, arguing that before the drainage ditch was covered, thus creating the conditions in that allowed de-oxygenated air to flow down the covered ditch and into the sump, there was no danger. No covered ditch, no problem with de-oxygenated air. And thus, presumably, no need for the re-design of the sump piping he refers to as a “water trap.” ( A “water trap” arrangement is , in effect, the structure Vernon Moen advocates in his communications with the Inspector of Mines.) Besides, the quantities of air released into the sump varies widely with the temperature and air pressure, and even if Teck Cominco had been testing for air quality prior to the accident, they might not have picked up on de-oxygenated air. Sometimes, he pointed out in a later phone interview, depending on temperature and pressure, the dump would be in effect “inhaling” air and sometimes “exhaling.” A problem only exists when the dump gives off de-oxygenated air and the air is contained, as it was beneath the cover over the ditch and within the sampling shed.
"Unfortunately, hindsight, although accurate, is not particularly useful except to understand the situation in question and to prevent such a problem from occurring in the future," wrote Dr. Meech.
Questions for inquest
It is unclear at this point whether the debate on sump and weir design at the Sullivan Mine will be addressed by the upcoming coroner's inquest, although Moen told The Tyee in early January that he had volunteered to testify about his concerns.
Other questions remain:
Who was responsible for keeping daily records of workers coming into and out of the mine site? The Teck Cominco report available at the government website blames Pryzm Environmental for the fact no such check-in/check out procedures were being enforced when Doug Erickson went onto the Sullivan property on May 15. Repeated attempts to obtain comment on these charges from Pryzm Environmental's CEO, John Przeczek, were unsuccessful by the time this story was filed.
Also vexing is the question of why there was a two-day lag between Erickson's death and the first attempts by Teck Cominco staff to find out what had happened to him.
The inquest may pursue whether Fred Hermann's report was accurate when it called the circumstances surrounding the four deaths "unprecedented."
It also remains to be seen whether the coroner's inquest will recommend changes in training for B.C. Ambulance workers who may be called upon to perform rescues in confined spaces.
In the meantime, the survivors of those who died at the Sullivan Mine and their neighbours in the close-knit Kootenays communities where the victims lived before the tragedy are left with their grief and questions, and their hopes the results of the inquest can go some distance toward resolving both.
"The inspector's report looked like a rush job," George Weitzel, whose wife Kim was one of the B.C. Ambulance paramedics who died at the mine site told The Tyee. "I hope the coroner's inquest can help guarantee that this never happens again. We are confident the truth will come out eventually. We can live with the truth, but we don't believe we've heard it yet."
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AH HA
5 years ago
Ask an expert
We have an expert here in the lower mainland who I would hope is called as an expert witness his mame is Neil T. McManus.
http://www.google.ca/search?hl=en&q=Neil+McManus&meta=
AH HA
5 years ago
edit
The correct name is Neil McManus the link remains the same.
alive
5 years ago
sump pump
Good to see that someone is taking this seriously!
Chances are that the issue will be swept under the rug, unless publicity forces the authorities to act!
Jonagold
5 years ago
C'mon, spell it right...
Ahem, "Kimberley"
John Meech
5 years ago
Clarification
I wish to clarify what has been reported as part of my email to the Tyee:
"before the drainage ditch was covered, thus creating the underground conditions in which chemical reactions could strip the air of oxygen, there was no danger that the altered air would be drawn through the ditch and into the shed -- no covered ditch, no problem with de-oxygenated air."
This implies that covering of the ditch created conditions in which the chemical reactions stripped the air of oxygen. This is not true - those conditions existed for many years before the tragedy in question and the covering done on the dump along with other reclamation work is designed to reduce these reactions and the flowrate of water to the sump from the dump.
What I actually wrote in my email to Mr. Sandborn was:
"before the drainage ditch was covered, thus creating the conditions that allowed de-oxygenated air to flow down the covered ditch and into the sump, there was no danger. No covered ditch, no problem with de-oxygenated air."
So the covering of the ditch creating a direct connection between the dump and the sampling station that allowed the deoxygenated air to enter and accumulate.
John Meech
5 years ago
Additional Comments of relevance to the "water trap"
There were also some relevant comments I made about the "water trap" suggested as being a required element in the design of the sump proposed by Mr. Moen:
"The concept of using a water trap to prevent air infiltration into the sump is certainly a possible solution to the situation, but one must understand that the original system prior to covering of the ditch had no need for a trap since the effluent from the dump was open to the atmosphere prior to entering into the sampling station. Installing a water trap places a point of restriction for the flow which could become blocked by solids that are entrained in the effluent. Installing a water trap places a point of restriction for the flow which could become blocked by solids entrained in the effluent. This could have resulted in spillage from the system into the environment - an event that the entire design was aimed at avoiding."
and
"The sump was not designed to address gas infiltration problems - its function was to provide a protected point to sample the effluent, measure its flowrate, and redirect it to the downstream pump station. In hindsight - yes, a redesign of the system to include a water trap might have been a good idea, but this presupposes that the unrecognized air/gas issues were identified.
Unfortunately, hindsight, although accurate, is not particularly useful except to understand the situation in question and to prevent such a problem from occurring in the future."
Vernon Moen
5 years ago
Towards preventing this from happening in the future....
I too would like to clarify, Dr. Meech:
A properly constructed campfire is entirely safe. If you should decide to build your tent around that campfire, it is not so safe. An elderly couple in Burnaby took an entirely safe electric generator from outside their home and placed it inside their home and they died as a consequence this winter. Many 'safe' things become potential hazards when they are confined. According the Teck Cominco Report, which appears as an attachment to the Sullivan Mines report, the 'monitoring station' (including the sump and weir) was designed and installed prior to 1995. At that time it was an 'open air' system that was entirely safe. However, on page 10 of this report it is acknowledged that the 'monitoring station' was modified over the course of the seven years from 1995 to 2002, presumably under the direction of a site engineer. The modifications included installing concrete blocks and elevating the ground around the 'monitoring station' , and adding a shed over top of this newly-formed hole in the ground. According to the pictures in this report, well before the the drainage ditch was confined in 2005, the culvert leading to the 'monitoring station' was covered over, and the sampling station was confined.
We will never know for sure the quality of the air in that 'monitoring station' from the period when the walls were raised and the shed was added through to 2005 because it was never treated as a confined space. I will note, however, that if at any time during that period there had been a gasoline leak (or any other hydrocarbon) into the ditch above the sampling shed the LEL in the shed would be measurably greater than zero, and there is no apriory basis to assume that it wouldn't have been over 100%. Therefore it is clear, Dr. Meech, that you assumption that there was no danger in this confined space appears to be based solely on faith.
I strongly object to the implications in the Tech report and in your analysis that, when constructing a confined space, one must wait for an identifiable hazard to 'show up' before any effort is made to prevent the hazard. First, it flies in the face of well established engineering principles. Second, just exactly how were the workers in this confined space to determine that a hazard had 'shown up'? Were they to report noxious odors? If one refers to the appearance of the sump and weir in the photograph of pages 79 through 81, it is very hard to imagine that the atmosphere was 'lemon fresh'. When does the employee go from considering it a 'stinky hole' to declaring it a 'confined space hazard'? Clearly that decision has to be taken by the engineers overseeing the construction of these spaces. Equally clearly, when a confined space is created (either pre-construction or 'as built'), it is critical that the safety of this enclosure must be considered.
Finally, I acknowledge freely that simply raising the V in the weir was not a good engineering solution given all the sound objectives this 'monitoring station' had to meet. I simply pointed out that this would have resolved the objective of gas trapping. A good design resolving all the valid design objectives (including sediment collection) would have taken time, effort, and expertise, all of which engineers are qualified and capable of doing.
Tom Sandborn
5 years ago
Dr. Meech's helpful clarification
Both the Tyee as a publication and I as the author of this story on the Sullivan Mine disaster are grateful to Dr. Meech, not only for his helpful input as the story was prepared but also for the note above, "Clarification", which corrects an unfortunate and unintended error on our part. Somehow, in the final editing process for this story just before it was posted, the older and slightly misleading text Dr. Meech refers to above migrated into the version that was posted, complete with its misleading reference to "chemical reactions underground." The Tyee and the author regret this error, and will be correcting it in the body of the story overnight when our web wizard is able to access our site.
Once again, we are grateful to Dr. Meech for this correction, and glad we are working in an interactive cyber forum that allows for such incremental moves toward accuracy.
Tom Sandborn