Enbridge, Canada's pipeline giant, faces $3.7 million in fines for breaking as many as two dozen rules governing the safety of crude oil pipelines during its disastrous $750-million Kalamazoo River spill in 2010.

The US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration released its notice of probable violations and associated fines yesterday to the company.

According to the regulator, the company failed to investigate crack-like anomalies in the line prior to the rupture on July 25, 2010. As soon as the line broke, "the company did not execute its suspected-leak or emergency procedures."

Instead the pipeline remained idle and a new shift of operators arrived at the Enbridge's Edmonton control centre. The new shift tried to restart the line, ignored warning alarms and "again Enbridge did not execute its suspected leak and emergency procedures." Instead it continued to pump 10,000 barrels of diluted bitumen into a broken pipe.

After abandoning the restart, Enbridge operators discussed the situation and then decided to restart the line again and pumped thousands of more barrels through the ruptured line.

During a second shift change more discussions were held but the company still failed to detect the leak. The employee of a local gas company in Michigan finally called and informed the company of the largest pipeline spill in the U.S. Midwest ever -- 17 hours later.

Here are some of the major rules (several were violated more than once) that Enbridge broke related to the 2010 pipeline rupture and for which the U.S. government is seeking a record fine of $3.7 million.   

1) Enbridge failed within 180 days after an integrity assessment of Line 6B to obtain sufficient information about crack-like conditions presenting a potential threat to the integrity of Line 6B.

2) In preparing the risk analysis, Enbridge failed to consider all relevant risk factors associated with the determination of the amount of product that could be released from a rupture on Line 6B. (Enbridge estimated that a worst case release from Line6 B might total 1,600 barrels. In reality the incident pumped more than 20,000 barrels into Michigan waterways.)

3) Enbridge did not properly consider the results of corrosion and cracking assessments, nor did Enbridge integrate the information from these assessments to properly assure overall pipeline integrity.

4) Enbridge failed to correct a condition that could affect the safe operation of a pipeline within a reasonable time following discovery.

5) Enbridge did not follow established written procedures for responding to, investigating, and correcting the cause of pressure outside of normal operating limits that were indicated during the Scheduled Shutdown.

6) Enbridge did not follow established written procedures for responding to, investigating, and correcting the cause of an unintended shutdown (Marshall Unit 2 is in Sequence off Alarm) that was indicated during the Scheduled Shutdown. Enbridge also did not notify responsible personnel in accordance with the procedure.

7) Enbridge did not take necessary action to minimize the volume of hazardous liquid released in the event of a failure or notify police during an emergency.

8) Enbridge did not evaluate the effectiveness of its public awareness program in accordance with the written procedures.

9) Enbridge operated Line 6B prior to correcting an unsafe condition that presented an immediate hazard to persons or property.

10) During the First Restart, Enbridge did not take necessary action to minimize the volume of hazardous liquid released in the event of a failure.        

11) During the First Restart, Enbridge did not follow established written procedures for responding to, investigating, and correcting the cause of pressure outside of normal operating limits.

12) During the First Restart, Enbridge used a draft procedure for starting up a pipeline with column separation instead of following a prepared and approved procedure for Suspected Column Separation (a bubble in the line).

13) Enbridge operated Line 6B prior to correcting an unsafe condition which presented an immediate hazard to persons or property.

14) During the Second Restart, Enbridge did not take necessary action to minimize the volume of hazardous liquid released in the event of a failure or notify police during an emergency.

15) Enbridge failed to accurately report required accident information at the earliest practicable moment following discovery to the National Response Center (NRC).

16) Enbridge failed to accurately report the time of failure and other significant facts relevant to the extent of damages associated with a pipeline rupture which occurred at 17:58 on July 25, 2010.

17) Enbridge operated Line 6B prior to correcting an unsafe condition which presented an immediate hazard to persons or property.

18) Enbridge failed to report currently available accident information on DOT Form 7000-1 within 30 days of discovery of the accident.

19) Enbridge did not submit supplemental reports within 30 days of receiving changes or additions to the information originally reported on DOT Form 7000-1 in Report #20100181-15259.

20) Enbridge allowed an unqualified individual to perform covered tasks (operating a pipeline) without direct observation by a qualified individual.

Award-winning journalist Andrew Nikiforuk writes about energy for The Tyee and others.